People’s Liberation Party (PPR) Statement – September 4, 2025
This assessment of the situation and our position is published after carefully and cautiously after observing and understanding the developments in the political situation throughout the last week of August 2025, so that we do not fall into political adventurism, the worship of spontaneous movements and mass anger, underestimating or overestimating mass consciousness, its dynamics, and the prospects for the struggle ahead.
If we examine the political escalation of this past week, there are several matters we must understand in order to form an assessment and establish a position and stance based on an understanding of several factors: first, the general state of the economy and its impact on the people; second, the cause of mass anger (social and political); third, an understanding of the first protest on August 25, 2025; fourth, the general bourgeois political constellation and its analysis; fifth, the state of the left-wing movement, the people’s movement and civil society organisations (CSOs) and; sixth, the dynamics of the political developments following the first demonstration.
These factors will determine: first, how do we respond and what must we do; second, what must be fought for; third, possible predictions for future political developments; and, fourth, the prospects for the development of the people’s struggle and the leadership of a counter (alternative) movement arising from the contemporary political escalation.
Factor One: The economic situation and its impact on the people
The economic situation fuelling the people’s anger is inseparable from the consequences of a flawed economic path and 60 years of mismanagement. This flawed path and mismanagement has long been pursued since the Suharto New Order regime and subsequent regimes, and the level of damage was deepened during the two terms of the administration of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. This is compounded by the contradictory economic policies of the administration of President Prabowo Subianto and Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka (Widodo’s son), which have resulted in the failure to build national industrialisation (becoming unindustrialised). The New Order regime’s 32-year path of military-capitalism and a neoliberal economics, which focused on cheap labour and natural resources, resulted in the state’s inability to build strategic industries, human capacity and capability, and the sustainability of its natural resources.
The Prabowo administration faces a shortage in the state treasury resulting from the financial extravagance of the Widodo administration in funding the construction of the Nusantara national capital city (IKN) in East Kalimantan, which by 2024 had coast IDR 89 trillion.[1] Prabowo’s promise to implement the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program requires IDR 420 trillion per year, or IDR 1.2 trillion per day. The total maturing debt that must be paid throughout 2025 amounts to IDR 800.33 trillion.[2] Although Prabowo stated he would tighten the budget, the bloated structure of his cabinet, a consequence of the broad political coalition, is estimated to drain the state budget by IDR 777 billion per year. The military budget has increased to IDR 245.2 trillion for 2025 from IDR 166.1 trillion in 2024. In fact, at the beginning of August, Prabowo purchased 48 fighter jets from Turkey for IDR 160 trillion.[3] This swelling of state budget expenditure is estimated to have resulted in a state budget deficit of IDR 662 trillion for 2025.[4] The House of Representatives’ (DPR) budget plan for 2026 has increased by IDR 9.9 trillion, or 47.98% from the previous year.[5]
In terms of the financial balance sheet, the Prabowo administration places greater emphasis on state revenue from taxes and debt.[6] It does not reduce expenditure or reallocate state spending. This was evident in the first quarter of 2025, where state revenue decreased by IDR 3.62 trillion.[7] Conversely, the government has continued to execute its spending allocations according to the initial plan, and it is highly likely that its spending allocations will increase.[8] This deficit in the state’s financial balance has led to a reduction in budgets for regional governments. The Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani, issued a ministerial decree regarding the cutting of regional financial transfers (TKD) for 2025,[9] which were slashed by 50%[10] compared to 2024. And for 2026, they will fall by 24.7% compared to 2025.[11] This reduction in financial transfers has led regional governments to increase the Rural and Urban Land and Building Tax (PBB-P2) for their citizens to supplement regional revenue budgets. Over 104 regional governments have increased their taxes, with 20 of them raising taxes by more than 100%.[12] The Cirebon City Government in West Java has even increased the tax by 1000%!
The decline in the people’s welfare is evident in the prediction that from October 20, 2024 to the end of 2025, more than 280,000 workers will be laid off (PHK).[13] Meanwhile, the reality is that throughout the first half of 2025, 42,385 workers have already been made redundant.[14] This figure is a 32.19% increase compared to the first half of 2024. According to the World Bank, Indonesia’s poverty line, based on LMIC (lower-middle-income countries), has increased from 15.6% (44.7 million) to 19.9% (57.05 million). This is an increase of more than 12 million poor Indonesians. Yet in the first quarter of 2025 (January-March), the figure was still around 15.6%. It is very clear that the impact of “profligate spending from above” and “austerity from below” is closely linked to the rise in poverty figures and the poverty line index.
Factor Two: The social-political cause of the mass anger
Since Prabowo-Gibran won the presidential election last year, there has been a significant increase in protests. This has included, at the least, protests against the revisions to the regional election law, movements under the hashtags #PeringatanDarurat (Emergency Warning), #kabursajadulu (Just Run Away), #IndonesiaGelap (Dark Indonesia), #TolakRUUTNI (Reject the Indonesian Military Bill), and protests over the blocking of 140,000 dormant accounts by the Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis Centre (PPATK), which harmed many ordinary people, and the way officials (including Prabowo) responded to these protests, which have resulted in rising distrust and revulsion towards state institutions, particularly the police and the legislature. Although mocking and seemingly scornful and insulting statements were also made by Prabowo, this revulsion and anger has not yet manifested in action against him personally. The escalation in actions culminating in demands for the resignation of state officials began in Pati regency.
The tax increases by the regional government that sparked protests and clashes with police and the public started in Pati Regency, Central Java. Pati Regent Sudewo raised land and property taxes by up to 250%. Residents then planned a protest for August 13. The regent’s statement in response to this seemed arrogant and lacked empathy. His challenge to residents to go ahead and protest resulted in a surge of donations in support the protest.[15] As a result, tens of thousands of Pati residents demanded Sudewo’s resignation,[16] even though he had already cancelled the tax increase.[17] The people of Pati were already incensed by Sudewo’s arrogant statement. Protests against tax increases then spread to Bone regency in South Sulawesi.[18] The protests in Bone opposing a tax increase of up to 300% ended in clashes with the police and 62 people arrested.[19]
After Pati and Bone, it did not take long for officials to add to the people’s revulsion and anger. This happened when DPR members were seen dancing at a People Consultative Assembly (MPR) annual session and when Ahmad Sahroni, a DPR member from the National Democrat Party (Nasdem), insulted the people protesting the salary and allowance increases for the DPR with the demand “Disband the DPR!” by calling them “the stupidest people in the world”. Scorn was also expressed by other DPR members who are also celebrities, such as Eko Patrio, Uya Kuya and Nafa Urbach. This arrogance and the insults by officials triggered public protest and anger.
Factor Three: Understanding the first protest on August 25
The protests began with a post on the social media platform TikTok a few days earlier, about a planned protest to demand the dissolution of the DPR on August 25. No one knew who set the date for the protest. Strangely, the plan for the August 25 protest only went viral on TikTok and was less widespread on Twitter. Political issues are usually more prevalent on Twitter and Instagram, as seen with the “#PeringatanDarurat” protests in August 2024 and “#IndonesiaGelap” in March 2025. According to netizens’ investigations, the social media accounts that first spread the plan for the August 25 protest were historically buzzer accounts that supported the Prabowo administration’s agenda and opposed mass actions. There were no consolidation meetings or protest preparations among non-government organisations (NGOs), labour movement organisations or student groups.
From information disseminated by the Jakarta Metro Jaya Regional Police, there were six groups that submitted notifications for protests on August 25 at the DPR, which, if combined, would not amount to 500 people. And only one organisation was publicly known, the Islamic Students’ Association (HMI). A few days before the protest, posters and demands circulated that seemed to favour the Prabowo administration, such as: disband the DPR, remove Gibran, sack the national police chief, regional police chiefs and district police chiefs who support “Mulyono” (Jokowi’s childhood nickname), and sack Mulyono’s cronies. The day before the protest, the plan, which had already gone viral, was met with a response from several Student Executive Councils (BEM) and student alliances with more radical demands: bring down Prabowo-Gibran, try and imprison Jokowi, disband the DPR, and others. Despite this, everyone was still asking, “who planned the protest on August 25 to disband the DPR?”.
The inaugural protest on August 25 began with a clash with security forces in front of the DPR at midday with a crowd of hundreds; by the afternoon, the crowd had grown to thousands, and it swelled further towards evening. Protesters live-streaming on TikTok, Facebook and Instagram caused the crowd to grow even larger. The majority of the crowd consisted of the urban poor, online motorcycle taxi drivers (ojol) and high school and vocational school teenagers. The clashes spread until midnight to various areas around the DPR such as Pejompongan, Petamburan, Bendungan Hilir and around the Gelora Bung Karno sports complex.
To this day, it remains uncertain who or which group first initiated, planned, and set the date of August 25 for the inaugural “Disband the DPR!” protest. Although suspicion leans more towards Prabowo’s side and his supporters as the “masterminds” of the initial plan rather than Jokowi-Gibran camp and their supporters. Fundamentally, it remains speculation, and an independent fact-finding team is needed to reach a shared conclusion about this historic moment. To ignore the investigation of these facts and merely regard it as the initiative and creativity of the masses will cause us to “dance to someone else’s tune”.
Factor Four: The general constellation of bourgeois politics
It has been a common assumption that the “political marriage” between Jokowi and Prabowo which ensured his presidential election victory would not last long. For Prabowo, any path had to be taken to become part of the ruling bourgeois. For Jokowi, who climbed to power not as part of the old national bourgeoisie, everything had to be done to ensure his political power could be sustained and continued. Even if it meant violating the Constitution and betraying his old allies. Essentially, in any bourgeois political union, the law of competition and conflict in the quest to be the most dominant is the iron law of their class interests. Political dominance paves the way for the accumulation and dominance of capital. This political union is no longer sustained by the stratagem of accommodating positions and money. There is not enough budget to continuously finance political accommodation, as seen in the analysis of the economic conditions.
The Prabowo-Jokowi political union has for several months shown latent cracks, including: Prabowo’s inaction on the issue of accusations that Jokowi’s university diploma is a fake, Prabowo’s inaction on calls for Gibran’s impeachment by several retired Indonesian Military (TNI) officers, Jokowi’s ally and business tycoon Riza Chalid being named a corruption suspect, the limitations on State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Minister Erick Tohir’s power and authority, the deployment of the TNI to back up the Attorney General’s Office to confront the police, and the struggle over the portion of functions and authorities in the Draft Criminal Code (RKUHAP), are facts that must be seen as friction and cracks between the old and new rulers.
Since Prabowo-Gibran were inaugurated, two major issues have followed them to this day: first, the issue that Prabowo will be overthrown before his second year in power and replaced by Gibran; second, that Prabowo’s political consolidation will be completed in the first year, followed by the removal of Jokowi’s and Gibran’s cronies from the government and state institutions. Both issues have become more rampant since August 25. Although the “ball” has not directed at Prabowo since August 25 and the peak of the protests and riots on August 30. Accompanied by National Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo (no relation), Prabowo stated he “will not back down” and accused the week-long protests of being acts of treason and terrorism. Prabowo’s statement actually strengthens public suspicion that the moment was used to point the finger at his competitors, rather than admitting his own inability to solve the problems. As a result, the suspicion about the removal of Jokowi’s cronies has become even stronger.
The police and Listyo Sigit, who is regarded by the public as the “golden boy” of the Jokowi administration, along with suspicions about the security institution’s links to the online gambling business, have not been promptly dismissed by Prabowo. The question, “why and for what purpose?”, will soon be answered in the future. However, for now, what can be concluded is that larger objectives cannot be met if concessions are not immediately given to the masses such as dismissing the national police chief. It seems the “ember in a husk” (that can burst into flames at any time) will be nurtured, as long as this “ember” does not turn the heat onto the Prabowo’s presidency, but instead onto the DPR and the police.
On the other hand, elite factions are scrambling to make political statements that reinforce the narrative: that there are internal and external forces seeking to overthrow Prabowo, and that Jokowi-Gibran and their cronies are being purged. No opposition faction has emerged. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), as a non-government party, has been “hamstrung” by the drawn out corruption case involving party General Secretary Hasto Kristiyanto and his release after being given amnesty by Prabowo. At least two or three factions within the PDI-P, namely the “opposition” to Prabowo (or perhaps more accurately, the faction outside the government) and the faction that joined the government, were forced to reconcile in the party’s annual congress in August under the term: a strategic partner of the Prabowo government. Realising the difficulty in overcoming economic problems and their impact, Prabowo is keen to bring the PDI-P (which won the largest number of votes in the 2024 legislative election) into his government. This is something Prabowo seems not to have fully achieved yet.
Former Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan and former Coordinating Security Minister Mahfud MD, two political elite figures who actually have the potential to become an opposition to the government, have not presented themselves as a counter-opposition. Anies, who has no party but is very popular and has a broad support base, is hampered by, first the criminalisation of his long-term ally former Minister of Trade Tom Lembong, then the abolition of his sentence by Prabowo. Prabowo “stole” the political credit from the criminalisation of Lembong, which many suspect was masterminded by Jokowi. During the week of protests, both Anies and Mahfud displayed a normatively critical position. Nothing more. However, their respective support bases in urban poor areas likely joined in venting their anger at the police and the DPR and regional parliaments (DPRD). As is usual in Indonesia’s political history since the New Order, the political elite always wait for crucial, safe and advantageous moments to become the “counter-opposition”. A similar thing happened in the leadup to Suharto’s resignation in May 1998.
Factor Five: State of the left-wing, people’s and civil society movements
The left-wing movement, the people’s movement, and the coalition of civil society organisations can be said to have been caught off guard by the speed of the recent political escalation, which was indeed beyond their reach and control. It is clear that the events of the last week were not initiated by these movements. Although most of them intervened after August 25. However, it is clear that this political escalation was not yet able be led by the left-wing movement, the people’s movements or civil society organisations.
The weakness of the left movement, especially the left that emerged from the pre-1998 spectrum, is due to mass demoralisation, divisions, ideological decline and the failure to become a political channel for the masses. The post-1998 spectrum left movement also has relatively less experience and political skill in assessing situations and facing political developments. Added to this is the massive trend of growth in radical petty-bourgeois individuals and communities who consider the led and organised struggle within left-wing parties as an outdated model of struggle. The left movement today is more diverse and fragmented. Rather than viewing this pessimistically, this diversity can be an opportunity and a strength if it can overcome the fragmentation and find minimum agreement on programs and tactics.
The growth of people’s movement organisations (labour, peasant, student and urban poor) has actually become more widespread and expansive since 1998. However, due to the lack of left-wing leadership, the transformation of the people’s movement from a social movement into a political movement has been hampered and slow. It has been less able to move quickly to intervene in moments and see windows of opportunity to accelerate mass consciousness and increase political escalation towards programmatic movement politics.
Civil society organisations actually have better infrastructure than the previous two movements. They are known by the media and have extensive networks although they do not have a broad mass base. Their tendency to limit their struggle to minimum demands for reform and easily achievable goals makes it difficult for them to lead and organise the revulsion and anger of the masses.
Factor Six: Political developments following the first demonstration
After the initial August 25 protest, the momentum of the issue was then taken up by trade unions belonging to the pro-government Labour Party to campaign for their own sectoral demands on August 28 at the DPR. The trade unions led by All Indonesian Trade Unions Confederation (KSPSI) President Andi Gani Nena Wea and Jumhur Hidayat, which had also initially planned to take to the streets, cancelled their planned action for unclear reasons. Said Iqbal, president of both the Confederation of Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPI) and the Labour Party, urged groups that intending to commit anarchic acts not to get involved and stated that the protest was only to fight for the demands of workers; for wage increases and to reject mass layoffs. Suspicions have arisen regarding competition among the elite leadership of the trade unions over who will lead the Task Force for Employment Termination and Deindustrialisation. It should be noted that Iqbal is a former cadre of the conservative Islamic-based Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and a loyal supporter of Prabowo since the 2014 presidential election. The majority of workers led by Iqbal ended their protest in the afternoon.
Towards the evening however the crowd began to swell. Clashes between security forces and demonstrators escalated until a fatal tragedy occurred: a paramilitary police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) tactical vehicle ran over two online motorcycle taxi drivers.[20] One died. The death of Affan Kurniawan sparked even greater anger. The protesters (mostly online motorcycle taxi drivers) then moved to the Brimob Headquarters in Kwitang near Pasar Senen in Central Jakarta where they surrounded the building and clashed with Brimob officers in the evening. The clashes continued through the night until the next day due to support from the local community.
The next day, on Friday August 19, people in more than 30 cities and regencies around the country took to the streets in varying numbers. In Jakarta, thousands of protesters led by students began to surround the Jakarta Regional Police Headquarters in the afternoon. Unarmed TNI personnel were deployed, but students from the University of Indonesia’s BEM shouted “Soldiers back to the barracks!”. This was the only significant report of a negative response to the deployment of the military amidst the protests. In contrast, Marines and Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) troops guarding the Brimob HQ was hailed by the crowd with cries of “Long live the TNI!”. TNI members were also seen distributing money and mineral water to the crowd.[21] In front of the DPR, the Marines and the Army guarded the building, replacing the police. The crowd also chanted “Long live the TNI!”.
Police offices came under siege and were set on fire in various parts of the country: the Cawang Sectoral Police station in East Jakarta, the East Jakarta District Police station in Jatinegara, the Kramat Sectoral Police station and the Gegana Headquarters in Kramat, Central Jakarta. Police posts around the DPR, in the Semanggi area and along Jalan Otista in East Jakarta to Pasar Senen in Central Jakarta were also targeted. Crowds also engaged in small-scale looting around Kwitang and set fire to public facilities at various protest points in East, South and Central Jakarta. Demonstrations that ended in the burning of state facilities also occurred in Mataram (West Nusa Tenggara), Makassar (South Sulawesi, where three people were reported dead), Medan (North Sumatra), Yogyakarta (Central Java), Bandung (West Java) and Surabaya (East Java).[22] In short, the public was in a state of fury with both the DPR and the police.
As of the writing of this report, between August 25-31 protests have occurred in more than 40 cities and regencies. At least nine people have died due to violence by security forces and unidentified individuals. More than 20 people are missing. Some 3,195 people have been arrested, and several regional legislative council offices and public facilities have been burnt down. The deployment of the military at protests, including at the homes of officials that were looted or at burned regional legislative offices, the arrest of Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) intelligence officers and TNI members at several riot locations, along with pro-Prabowo accounts that appear to direct the issue towards the dissolution of the DPR, the impeachment of Gibran, the arrest and/or trial of Jokowi, and the dismissal of the national police chief, force us to recall the pattern that occurred during that mass protests and rioting in 1998 that forced Suharto to resign. Although different, there is a similar pattern.
Prabowo responded by immediately consolidating the leaders of the major religious organisations and then the political parties with seats in the DPR. This included PDI-P Chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was “indebted” to Prabowo due to the amnesty given to Hasto Kristiyanto. Concessions to the mass anger were made by deactivating several DPR members who had insulted the people. Conversely, demonstrators were punished with accusations of treason and terrorism and the police were permitted to take firm action. Two days later, the arrests of activists began who were made the scapegoats. The parliamentary parties had lost their legitimacy due to the people’s demand for the dissolution of the DPR and all the party leaders were quick to respond to Prabowo’s summons. Prabowo meanwhile, gained credit as the “saviour of the situation”. In the future, the popularity of these parties will plummet compared to Prabowo and his Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), unless a larger dynamic emerges. In the current situation, if an election were held tomorrow, it would very likely be won by Gerindra and Prabowo. This is because not a single significant attack has been directed at the legitimacy of his presidency.
What we can conclude from the political escalation over the last week is that it was caused by the convergence of three aspects: first, the mass anger (running amok) resulting from the economic, social and political situation; second, the mass anger was exploited by the struggle between the elites (Jokowi/Gibran vs Prabowo) or the police vs TNI; and, third, the intervention by elite factions and their supporters who lack the courage to declare themselves as the opposition.
The mass anger towards the DPR and the police, and the destruction and looting, which was still on a small scale compared to 1998, represents limited progress. Due to the absence of leadership from an alternative movement, it is still quite difficult for this to transform into a political crisis that can be accelerated. The people’s anger is a manifestation of spontaneous mass consciousness. This anger can lead to progress or regression. It depends on which side is more dominant and able to lead. Whether it is the elites and their struggles, or the people’s movement and its cooperation.
The mass anger is being exploited by the struggle between elites and the state’s apparatus of violence (TNI vs Police) to create riots as a pretext to easily push back social and political movements that have the potential to become an alternative from below in the future. So far, Prabowo has been able to contain the “ember in the husk”, as he still feels it is under his control. However, this “ember in the husk” could well “burn him” in the future or strengthen his position under the pretext of saving the state and nation through a presidential decree, martial law and the return to power through the MPR consultation mechanism according to the original 1945 Constitution; it all depends on the related and conflicting political forces.
The economic crisis and financial bankruptcy are clearly visible. However, whether this economic crisis not only becomes a social crisis but also a political crisis, and further still a revolutionary crisis, depends on how the development of an alternative from below provides hegemonic leadership to the people.
How do we respond and what must we do?
Although this position and stance can be said to be belated, it is certainly important for it to be explained as an understanding for the next dynamic. It is certainly important for us to respond to this political escalation with clarity of thought, vigilance and a clear position. And to dismiss the subjectivity that exaggerates mass consciousness and dynamics by declaring “the revolution is at the door”. Such recklessness would be fatal for the organisation, unity and struggle of the people. Therefore, objectivity must always be our guiding principle.
From the explanation above, there are several things the movement must do:
First, there is a need for a leadership strategy that manifests as a centre for political consolidation among a combination of the left-wing movement, the people’s movements and civil society organisations. A minimum agreement among these three elements is better than no agreement at all and no central consolidation whatsoever. Without a central consolidation, even one with a democratic-reformist character, we cannot expect there to be a democratic leadership that can become a pole of attraction, let alone hope for a revolutionary leadership.
Second, a grassroots strategy. Although social media is the fastest means to disseminate ideas and narratives to the people, the building of territorial, village and factory-level resistance committees is the best basis for establishing resistance organisations and forums for democracy, coordination and public education. The design of resistance organisations is best built physically (offline) rather than virtually (online).
Third, in the current situation, the battle between true and false narratives is very swift. An integrated and easily understood campaign is needed to counter the false narratives being spread. One that is fast, accurate, factual, engaging, easy to understand, and massive, organised collectively and integrated, is the key.
Fourth, workers must be radicalised and mobilised from both territorial and sectoral areas, and then organised systematically by continuously encouraging and training the leadership of the progressive labour movement as a more organised sector so that it is not easily infiltrated and pitted against itself.
What must be fought for?
The demand to “Disband the DPR” must be understood within its original context and surrounding circumstances. We should not accept it without question. In Indonesia’s political history, there have been three occasions where the issue of dissolving the parliament has arisen.
First, when Indonesia’s founding President Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly through a presidential decree on July 5, 1959. The reason was that the Constituent Assembly had failed to produce a new Constitution to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1950. This conflict and political turmoil in parliament were exploited by the military to pressure Sukarno to issue the presidential decree immediately. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly gave a greater role to the military, something it had hoped for since the October 17, 1952 affair.
Second, when the remaining forces of the New Order, the TNI, the police and an alliance of sham reformists (Amien Rais, Hamzah Haz, Megawati), were disturbed by reforms carried out by then President Abdurahman “Gus Dur” Wahid, such as his apology to the victims of the 1998 racism, his apologies to the families of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) members and sympathisers, his request to revoke Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) Decree 25/1966 on banning communism in Indonesia and providing space for dialogue for the political expression of the Papuan people and so on. So at that time, the DPR was in opposition to a president who wanted to resolve past issues and expand (albeit liberal) democracy.
Third, the context of today. The DPR is predominantly composed of members of Prabowo’s government coalition. There is no opposition. Meanwhile, the PDI-P, as a non-coalition party, declares itself a “strategic partner”. Essentially, the DPR is a “rubber-stamp” institution for Prabowo. The “ball” is being directed only at the legislature which actually benefits the executive.
Therefore, we do not advocate the call to “Disband the DPR!”. But because mass anger is already directed at the DPR, we will not impede its expression. Instead, we will clearly elucidate the core issues of the DPR’s corruption and its ties to Prabowo and the prevailing political and economic system. Currently, calls for a People’s Council, a Commune or Democratic Confederalism remain abstract jargon, lacking a concrete material basis. There is no central point for the consolidation and unity of the populace and their organisations, and these concepts are not widely understood by the public. A significant portion of those participating in protests are still unorganised. The fundamental demands are:
- Organise, unite and resist for a just, equal, democratic, ecological and modern republic with a people-cantered vision!
- Establish a People’s Presidium for alternative politics!
On other matters, such as the minimum wage demands for officials and workers, and the reform of the National Police and TNI, we can generally concur with these nascent democratic demands.
Predictions for future political developments
Protests planned by several groups are scheduled to continue until September 5, although religious organisations have been gathered by Prabowo to call for “calm” and “peace”.[23] And the leaders of the parliamentary parties have been consolidated. Concurrently, a conciliatory stance is emerging among some DPR members and the political parties, with DPR Speaker Puan Maharani having issued an apology[24], the Golkar Party has agreed to the cancellation of DPR members’ allowances[25] and parties have deactivated members who triggered the people’s anger. The demonstrations, clashes and anger that spread to more than 40 cities and regencies have drastically decreased since Prabowo accused the demonstrators of “treason” and “terrorism” and warned that “firm action will be taken”. The absence of leadership from organisations and figures considered pluralist, populist and democratic, the growing number of casualties among demonstrators, and the fear-mongering conditioned by the TNI and National Police apparatus, has meant that the direction and movement of the “ball” have so far been determined by the most dominant element, Prabowo and his state apparatus.
Prospects for future developments
The Prabowo-Gibran administration’s failure to address the root economic and social issues, coupled with mismanagement, could lead to more spontaneous, sporadic and leaderless mass uprisings in the future. These outbursts would likely be beyond the control of any organised people’s movement. A glimmer of hope may emerge from the unity of left-wing, popular and social movements, offering crucial direction and leadership. Otherwise, the dire alternative is a return to a bleak period of Prabowo-style military dictatorship. This could unfold if, at the height of the economic crisis and escalating political tensions, widespread public anger erupts into chaos, giving Prabowo a pretext to declare martial law.
We are hopeful that the worst-case scenario can be avoided. By maintaining patience, flexibility and humility, coupled with the soundness of our program and tactics, we can lay the groundwork for strengthening our organisation and fostering unity among the people.
The Battle Field (Medan Juang), September 3, 2025
National Collective of the People’s Liberation Party
[3] https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cyvnq7406mjo
[5] https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/anggaran-dpr-naik-dana-daerah-turun-2063514
[8] https://kbr.id/articles/indeks/apbn-2025-defisit-belanja-negara-tetap-jalan-dan-bertambah
[11] https://www.kppod.org/berita/view?id=1447
[15] https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/anggaran-dpr-naik-dana-daerah-turun-2063514
[16] https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/c1ejd9vjv1wo
[18] https://www.tempo.co/politik/daftar-daerah-yang-menggelar-demo-tolak-kenaikan-pbb-p2-2061043
[22] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/29/why-are-antigovernment-protests-taking-place-in-indonesia
[23] https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8088108/presiden-prabowo-undang-16-ormas-keagamaan-di-hambalang
[24] https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8087875/puan-maharani-minta-maaf-kami-akan-dengar-aspirasi-rakyat
[25] https://www.metrotvnews.com/read/N6GCxJpW-fraksi-golkar-setuju-pembatalan-tunjangan-dpr
